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How did industrialization in the nineteenth century affect the well-
being of children among American working class families? Two revealing
surveys from 1890 and 1907 are used to examine the implications of child
labor on schooling decisions and on possible offsetting intrafamily transfers,
in the form of current "retained" earnings or future asset transfers. Both
issues are analyzed within the context of a formal model of family labor
supply, in which returns to schooling accrue after the youth has left the
household and thus the interests of the parents and the child need not
coincide. Parents working in the industries examined did not, it appears,
compensate their children for the reduced future earnings implied by child
labor, in either the current or in future time periods. But, in addition,
the migration of families in which parental altruism was weak may have
eliminated much of the apparent increase in family income due to higher
child earnings. We end with a note reconciling our findings with the long













Economic Well—being and Child Labor: The
Interaction of Family and Industry
ABSTRACTInsofar as machinery dispenses with muscular power,
it becomes a means of employing laborers of slight
muscular strength, and those whose bodily development
is incomplete, but whose limbs are all the more sup-
ple.. ..The value of labour—power was determined, not
only by the labour—time necessary to maintain the in-
dividual adult laborer, but also by that necessary to
maintain his family. Machinery, by throwing every
member of that family on thelabor market, spreads
the value of the man's labour—power over his whole
family In order that the family of four may live,
four people must now, not only labour, but expend
surplus—labour for the capitalist... .Previously, the
workman sold his own labour power, which he disposed
of nominally as a free agent. Now he sells wife and
child. He has become a slave dealer.
Karl Marx, Capital
(1906, pp. 431—32; Orig. Pub. 1867)
1.0. Introduction
The process of industrialization altered radically the types of work
activities demanded of the labor force. As Marx noted in the quotation
above, industries developed in which sheer physical strength was relatively
less valuable and nimbleness and dexterity relatively more productive than
in the agricultural economy within which industrialization occurred. Asa
result the ratios of the wages of young people and of females of allages
to that of adult males rose substantially in the transition from agri-
culture to industry (Coldin and Sokoloff, 1980). The increase in the
demand for female and teenage labor had important social consequences that
have been intensively studied since the time of Marx. In this paper we
explore both theoretically and empirically the effect of this increased
demand on the well—being of the family, particularly of theyoung, and on
intra—family relations.
The two data sets we employ for this study are derived fromsurveys
undertaken in the U.S. around 1900. Both surveys were bases for seminal
studies of working—class or industrial families, living mainly (although—2—
not ho11y) in nonurban areas. Our empirical analysis therefore should
be useful in understanding the impact of industrialization on iptrafamily
relations during much of the nineteenth century, when industry evolved out-
side the large commercial centers.
In the early stages of mechanization in the U.S., the percentage of
the industrial labor force that was young and/or female was extremely high,
but it began a secular decline as early as 1840 (Goldin and Sokoloff, 1980).
By 1900 the simple generalization proposed by Marx, that mechanization en-
hanced the usefulness of child labor, is not completely supported by evi-
dence for the U.S. A cross—state analysis of 1900 Census of Population data
indicates that the labor force participation rate of males 10 to 15 years
old was not significantly higher in the manufacturing and mining sectors
than in agriculture, although the rate for females 10 to 15 years was higher
in manufacturing.1 Certain industries, for example textiles, boots and
shoes, paper,. and clothing, did employ substantially more young labor, par-
ticularly female labor, than did others, such as iron and steel and mining.
The data in Table 1 make clear that the location of working—class
families in 1890 was a prime determinant of the employment of their chil-
dren. The likelihood that a boy of age 11 to 13 would be in the labor
force if the father was in textiles was just over 40 percent; if the father's
industrial employment was not in textiles, only 11 percent,For females,
the likelihood that a daughter of a textile worker was in the labor force
rose from 34.5 percent for those 11 to 13 to 97.7 percent for those 16—17,
the rise for daughters from nontextile families only from 1.4 percent to
21.8 percent. These dramatic differences are not simply a reflection of
differences in parental income. Even among textile families with father's—3—
TABLE 1
THEEMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY O CHILD BY AGE, SEX,
INDUSTRY,AND FATHER'S EARNINGS, c.
b . c Sex/Age— Total Low Earnings High Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) TextileNontextjleTextile NontextileTextileNontextilE
Child
5—10 0.064 0.020 0.104 0.020 0.036 0.023
Male
11—13. 0.411 0.110 0.546 0.258 0.130 0.067
14—15 0.846 0.543 0.919 0.796 °•646d 0.411
16—17 0.930 0.757 0.813 0.836 -1.008 0.694
18+ 0.773 0.814 0.716 0.782 0.852 0.800
Female
a 11—13 0.345 0.014 0.480 —0.006 0.131 .0.021
14—15 0.734 0.141 0.798 0.215 0.525 0.130
16—17 0.977 0.218 0.985 0.412 0.642 0.146
18+ 0.850 0.234 0.845 0.518 0.645 0.137
aSource: Derived from a regression analysis based on theWright 1890
study (seE text, 1.0). The full estimating equation is available from the
authors.
bFathervs earnings less than or equal to $400 (1890$).
CFathers earnings more than $400 (1890$). -
dTheestimating procedure yields probabilities outside the 0—1 interval.—4—
earnings above the mean for textile workers (approximately $400 ,1890$),
almost two—thirds (64.2 percent) of the young women 16—17 worked.
What were the consequences for the family and for the young of this
"opportunity" for child labor that the textile industry offered? The ef-
fect on current family income was substantial. Average earnings E child
were approximately $50 per year higher for males 14 to 17 in textiles than
elsewhere (Table 2, columns 1 and 2); average adult male earnings in the
sample were only slightly more than $500 per year. For females 14 to 17,
the difference in earnings was more than $100 per year between sectors.
The cost to family members of the increased child earnings, however,
was also real. Schooling was the principal alternative time use for chil-
dren. Among males 11 to 13, those in textile families were only half as
likely to be attending school as those in nontextile families, 41.3 per-
cent and 75.6 percent respectively (see below, Table 4). The same wide
disparity existed for female offspring. The likelihood that a
daughter 11—13 was in school was 48.8 percent in textile families, 86.3
percent in nontextile.families. This attenuated schooling must surely •have
reduced the future.earning capacity of the children of textile workers.
Section 2.0 develops more formally a model of faEiily labor supply
with emphasis on the schooling—work decision of children and young adults.
In Section 3.0 industry effects on the future economic well—being of off-
spring in the U.S. at the turn of the century are estimated. In particular
the implications of child labor for schooling and subsequent earnings are
more carefully assessed. Since the returns to schooling accrue largely
after the youth has left the household, the interests of the parents (the
presumed decision—makers) and the interests of the young are not necessarily
identical.2 Interests coincide only to the extent parents perceive the—5—
TABLE 2
MEAN INCOME (1890$) PER CHILD BY AGE, SEX, INDUSTRY,
AND FATHER'S EARNINCS, c.
Sex/Age Total Low Earl4nsb HighEarningsC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TextileNontextileTextileNontextileTextileNontextile
Child
5—10$ 3.79 $2.45 $ 2.06$ 1.44 $ 5.25$ 3.03
Male
11—13 22.86 10.01 24.18 24.37 16.62 5.80
14—15 109.56 65.97 123.78 89.00 80.90 53.45
16—17 188.34 120.50 184.48 l3.l1 186.90 107.88
18+ 211.55 235.45 201.08 231.01 236.23 236.09
Female .
11—13 21.39 4.19 24.43 9.15 15.38 2.42
14—15 113.59 13.26 131.05 20.76 76.00 11.89
16—17 147.93 35.04 149.46 58.46 120.76 25.53
18+ 188.50 32.99 191.25 45.66 157.81 29.59
Source: Wright 1890 Study (see text 1.Q).
asee Table 1 for estimation technique. Note that these estimates are
per child, not per working child.
bFathers earnings less than or equal to $400 (1890$).
cFathers earnings more than $400 (1890$).—6—
future wealth of their offspring as an increase in their own well—being.
Parental altruism therefore is obviously critical.
The possibility of offsetting intra—family physical asset transfers
for the reduced earnings capacity of those with less schooling is also con-
sidered, since parents may have compensated children for reduced schooling
with larger physical wealth transfers. Such does not appear to be the
case. The results indicate that parents working in industrial
sectors where the demand for child labor was high did not compensate their
children for the reduced schooling and future earnings capacity implied by
the child labor. Any compensation to the child apparently caine from the
additional current consumption that the family as a whole may have enjoyed.
We also show that the increased earnings of the children need not even be
translated into an equivalent increase in family consumption if parental
altruism is weak. Competition among families in the labor market may have
eliminated much of the apparent increase in family income due to higher
child earnings. Many manufacturing centers in nineteenth century America
were oriented around a single industry because of natural resource require-
ments (e.g. water power, coal, iron ore). The geographical isolation of
these industries made labor supply mainly a product of family migration.
If enough parents were unconcerned about the sacrificed future earnings of
their offspring, the equilibrium wage of a father in textiles would be lower
dollar for dollar for each dollar of earnings of their working children.
But to the extent that reduced schooling and implicitly reduced future in—
•come of the child were valued by the parents, equilibrium adult wages would
not fall dollar for dollar with the earnings gained by increased child labor.
En Section 4.0 we explore this interaction between child labor oppor-
tunities and adult (male) wages to determine the extent to which adult wages—7—
were reduced by the potential for child labor. The brief conclusion,
Section 5.0, reviews and interprets our findings in light of the remark-
able expansion in educational attainment during the second decade of this
century.
The principal data source we have used in this paper is derived from
the Sixth and Seventh Annu4p2Ltsof the Commissioner of Labor, namely
Carroll Wright, a pioneer in modern labor statistics. This detailed survey
of 6,800 industrial families in 1889—90 was undertaken to provide infor-
mation for the McKinley Tariff of l890. But it was also the first exten-
sive national survey of family budgets, a precurser to our modern cost of
living surveys. We will refer to this report as the Wright 1890 Stu4y. A
second data source has been employed which gives information on the fraction
of earnings working children retained for their own use.It is the exten—
sive 19 Volume Senate Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage
Earners conducted in 1907 and will be referred to as the 1907 Report.
2.0. Child Labor and Child Economic Well—being:
A Model
The evidence presented in the introduction, on the unusually high em—
ployment of child labor in the textile industry and the correspondingly low
level of schooling attainment, raises the issue posed by Marx and others;
Was child well—being reduced by industrialization? Certainly no theorem on
the operation of the market system guarantees that technological advances
will improve the economic well—being of all groups, particularly the young.
The market "guarantees" little to children whose well—being is principally
dependent on the altruism of the parents. As discussed at length in
Eshikawa (1915) and Parsons (1977), the dependence of child well—being on
parental altruism is particularly important in the child labor decision—8—
since the principal cost of child labor is the foregone schooling and future
(adult) income of the child. The mortality of the parents and, more im-
portantly, the absence of enforceable long run human service contracts
make the evaluation of the long run benefits of schooling critically de-
pendent on the altruism (or lack thereof) of the parents. The current earn-
ings of the child are, within limits, the parents to allocate; the child's
future earnings are not.
Child labor need not imply a complete absence of parental concern nor
need it reflect family economic desparation. Even a wealth maximizing in-
dividual (or purely altruistic parent) will be sensitive to current as well
as future income prospects. The higher the wage rate of children, ceteris
paribus, the less valuable (net) is a given schooling investment. Rational
parents who intend to transfer wealth to their offspring will presumably
transfer wealth to the child in human investment form until the returns de-
cline to the level of the rate of return on physical assets. Beyond that
point, all transfers will be in the form of physical assets.4 A rise in
current child earning power may therefore only signal that it is optimal to
reallocate intergenerational transfers from human to physical.form.
A simple model will illustrate the family decision process and will
provide the basis for the discussion of the family labor market in Section
4.O. Imagine a parent—child world in which theparent has complete au-
thority to allocate resources, including the child's time. Assume moreover
that the parent's utility (U) is a function of current family consumption
and future child wealth, to be concrete the geometric mean with weights
a and $ respectively,
1) U
where Ccurrent family consumption and W future child wealth.6—9--
The parent must make two interdependent decisions:(1) choose the
amount of total family earning capacity to allocate to current family
consumption and to future child wealth, and (2) choose the composition of
transfers to the child, consisting of both schooling and physical assets.
Pantily income in the current period will be the sum of parent and child
earnings or
2) IE + =E+
(H—S)w0
where If family income,
H parent earnings,
Ecurrentchild earnings,
wage rate of child,
H Etotaltime of the offspring under the control of the parent,
and
S Echildtime spent in school, S <H.
The future wealth of the child, ignoring for simplicity the discount
factor, is the sum of physical wealth transfers and future child earnings,
or
3)
where T a physical wealth transfers from the parent to child and a future child
earnings. Since we assume that parents have no control over the child's
income in the second period, the transfers must be nonnegative CT >
Childearnings in adult life are assumed to be a function of schooling
investment as a child, specifically
4)E1=S', >O, O-cy<l—10—
where and y are parameters of the wage function. The parameter y is
the schooling elasticity of earnings.
The parental decision problem, then, is to choose levels of current
consumption (C), physical transfers to the child (T), and schooling (S)
that will maximize parental utility, equation (1), subject to the parental
income constraint [C +T=E+ w0(ll —S)}and, the inequality constraint
on transfers (T >0).Forming the Lagrangian,8
5)L CWS_A[C + T —E—
w0(H
—
thenecessary conditions for a maximum are:
U
6)jEa—X=O.
IT y—l 7) =SyS —Xw00,
U — ALI
9)1t-{C+T_E_wo(H_S)]=0.
If physical transfers to the youth ate positive, so that equation
(8) holds as an equality, then it is easy to derive the behavioral func-
tion for schooling from equations (7) and' (8), since these reduce to the
simple wealth maximizing rule that schooling will be undertaken until the
increment in future earnings is just offset by the foregone current earn-
ings (,ySY1 w0). Therefore
10) S* (tY)l/l—Y
wo—11—
where the asterisk denotes the optimizing level of S. Optimal schooling
increases with -y, the elasticity of earnings with respect to schooling,
and decreases with w0, current wage levels. Total family income affects
total child future wealth, but not schooling levels when optimal physical
transfers are positive. The optimal schooling is undertaken and the re-
mainder transferred in physical asset form.
In the simple utility function assumed here, the optimal family






—5*)+ 5* =E++ E1.
Clearly F is total family wealth, including the future earnings of the
child. Family consumption and child wealth increase proportionately with
F, where the proportions are ci/(ct +)and/(cc +)respectively.The
elasticity of parental utility with respect to child wealth (e)couldbe
considered a measure of parental altruism.
Physical transfers (T) are the residual of child wealth less human
capital transfers (S*'), or
13) T=W—
Clearly if family wealth (F) or family altruism (13) are sufficiently low,
the total transfers that the parents choose to make to the child are less
than the child's future earnings alone.Since we assume that parents cannot capture—12—
the child's future earnings (or borrow on them), they can increase cur-
rent family tonsuinption only by having the child work more (undertake less





Inthis constrained environment, optimal schooling will increase linearly
with earnings of the male head (E) and decline with the child's wage (w0).
In the next section we explore these family decisions empirically.
In particular we estimate the effect of child labor on schooling and on
subsequent earnings capacity and then attempt to determine the extent to
which this reduction in future earnings is offset by physical asset trans-
fers to the child made possible by the family's higher current earnings.
3.0. The Future Well—being of Children:
Empirical Estimates
The future wealth position of one's offspring will depend on two
types of transfers, earning capacity (schooling and other forms of skill
acquisition) and physical assets (gifts and bequests). In this section
we explore the effect of child labor on these two types of transfers to
the child in the U.S. around 1900. In Section 3.1 we consider the effect
of child labor on schooling attainment and on future earnings. Sections
3.21 and 3.22 explore the issue of whether working children are compen-
sated within the family by gifts (principally "retained" earnings) and by
bequests later in life, controlling for parental income.—13—
3.1. Child Schooling and Future Earnings
Most children of industrial workers in the Wright 1890 Study were
engaged either in work or in school by the age of eleven (see Table 3).
Thus it is almost definitional that child labor reduced the amount of
schooling and perhaps the ultimate earning capacity of the child. The
data on the fraction in school by age in Table 3 are indirect estimates
obtained by regressing the number of children per family in school on the
age—sex composition of the family, since theobservation units are the
family and not the individualmembers.9 The probability that a male child
11—13 was in school, 0.60, is the coefficient of number of male children
11—13 in a "number of children in school" regression. The sum of the
estimated work and schooling probabilities is tolerably close to one,
even for females, which makes us confident in the results fromthis pro-
cedure. Furthermore, the schooling probabilities for industries other
than textiles (see Table 4) are strikingly similar to those for youths in
the entire U.S. in 1890.
Schooling probability estimates by industry (textile, nontextile)
are reported in Table 4. The frequency of child labor among textile
families is clearly reflected in the probability that a child of a given age
was in school. The probability that a male child between the ages of 11
and 13 would be in school was 41.3 percent in textile families and 75.6
percent in nontextile industrial families. By 14 to 15, only 13.1 percent
of male youtlEin textiles were in school, while 36.5 percent of males of.
this age were in school in nontextile industries. The differentials in
schooling attendance are even larger for females in these age intervals.—14—
TABLE 3
THE ELOYMENT AND SCHOOLING PROBABILITY OF CHILDREN
IN INDUSTRIAL FANILIES, U.S., c.
(1) (2) (3)
_____AtWork At School Work or School
Child
5—10 0.02 0.53 0.55
Na 1 e
11—13 0.24 0.60 0.84
14—15 0.69 0.25 0.94
16—17 0.86 0.05 0.91
18+ 0.78 0.01 0.79
Female
11—13 0.21 0.65 0.86
14—15 0.49 0.39 0.88
16—17 0.72 0.04 0.76
18+ 0.74 002h 0.72
Source: Wright 1890 study.
aSee Table 1 for estimation techniques.
hThe estimating procedure does not constrain the esti-
mates to the 0—1 interval.—15—
TABLE 4
THE PROBABILITY OF CHILD IN SCHOOL BY AGE, SEX,






































































Table 1 for estimation technique.
bFatherls earnings less thanor equal to $400 (1890$).
CFatherls earnings greater than $400 (1890$).
dThe estimating procedure admits values outside thezero—one interval.—16—
Separating the sample by father's income less than or equal to $400
(1890$) and greater than $400 (Table 4, columns 3—6)J1revealsthat both
industry and parental income had powerful effects on the likelihood that
the child was in school. Among low wage families in textiles 27.7 percent
of males 11—13 were in school, in nontextiles 50.5 percent. Among high
wage families, the corresponding percentages are 72.2 percent and 84.3 per-
cent.
A more precise estimate of the industry effects on median schooling,
controlling for father's income, can be obtained by estimating separately
(by industry) the number of children in school per family, including inter-
action terms between father's earnings and the sex—age composition of the
household. Ordinary least squares estimates are reported in Table 5. It
is clear that father's earnings strongly and significantly increased the
likelihood that a child of either sex was in school at any particular age.
With these estimates (Table 5), it is possible to compute the indus-
try effect on median schooling or, more precisely, to estimate the median
age of schooling departure, controlling for differences in income. Using
male offspring of textile workers as an exacuple, the estimates in Table 5,
column 2 give the probability that a male child will be in school as:
15)Prob(male in school;textiles) =0.689—0.044Age
+ 0.00049 Father's Earnings.
Substituting mean father's earnings in the full sample ($517.68) into the
equation, permits us to calculate the age at which the probability of being
in school is 0.5, namely 10.1 years of age. Similar calculations can be
made for females and for children of both sexes in nontextile families.
These are reported in Table 6. The median age of school departure is 3.1—17—
TABLE 5
NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN SCHOOL, INDUSTRIAL
FAMILIES IN THE U.S., c. 1890a
Textiles Nontextiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.056 0.068 —0.016 —0.011
(2.34) (3.11) (0.82) (0.60)
Children 5_10b 0.536 0.444 0.642 0.565
(33.43) (28.35) (45.96) (42.70)
Males ll+ 0.158 0.689 0.306 1.688
(9.05) (6.20) (17.97) (15.73)
Males *Aged —0.044 —0.104
(6.38) (15.67)
Males *Pather'sEarnings 0.00049 0.00041
(7.64) (9.99)
Females 11+ 0.107 0.775 0.481 1.909
(7.33) (7.71) (26.86) (18.01)
Females *Age —0.052 —0.101
• (8.80) (15.41)
'ema1es *Father'sEarnings 000069 0.00023
(12.53) (5.85)
0.33 0.44 0.55 0.62
Sample Size 3043 3043 3766 3766
Source:Wright 1890 study.
aThe absolute values of the t—ratios are reported in parentheses.
bNumber of children in family between five and ten years old.
cNumber of male children eleven years of age or older.
dCumulativeages of all males 11 years of age or older.
eAdjusted R2.—18—
years less among males in textiles, 2.9 years among femalcs, than it is






Source: Table 5 and text.
Most estimates of the pecuniary return to education (e.g. Becker,
1975, Hansen, 1963) pertain to a relatively modern period in the evolution
of the American economy, but .many have asserted that returns to education
were even higher at the turn of this century than at its midpoint. The in-
dividuals we have been analyzing lived just prior to a great watershed in
schooling attainment in the U.S.; median years schooling increased by over
one—third during the brief period from about 1915 to 1930.12 This rapid
expansion of more educated workers is reflected in the substantial drop in
the skilled to unskilled wage ratio throughout the first half of this
century and particularly during the period of most rapid advance in edu-
cational attainment.13
Education clearly augmented mean earnings for individuals
of the schooling vintage we have been analyzing. This was true, if less
pronounced even for females. The 1907 Report, briefly described in Section
1.0, contains information on months schooling and literacy for young,—19—
unmarried female workers. Log earnings equation (16) indicates that
schooling increased earnings for females about 2 percent per year around
the mean, controlling for experience, age, and region. Equation (17)
shows that literacy, by itself, augmented earnings by over 13 percent.
16) Log Annual Earnings =Ect.X.+0.034S —0.00172
11(4.90) (2:71)
R2 for entire equation =0.810
17)Log Annual Earnings = +0.134 L
(6.94)
R2 for entire equation =0.810
Eexperience,experience squared, log days worked, age at which
work began, regional or state dummies.
S E(monthsof schooling/8).
L Eliteracy,i.e. can read or write.
Source: 1907 Report, number of observations 2515.
Although education may have enhanced a young woman's home produc-
tivity and may have led to a more lucrative marriage, the eventual penalty
from reduced schooling was probably not as great as it was for a young
man, whose labor force experience continued far beyond his unmarried
yearsJ4 The penalty of not continuing schooling to high school foryoung
men at this time must have been on the order of 10 to 15 percent of their
future yearly earnings.
3.20. Physical Wealth Transfers to Offspring
The question obviously arises whether the reduced schooling for
children of textile workers reflected a shift in the composition of asset—20—
transfers to the offspring rather than a reduction in total asset trans-
fers. Parents may simply have been optimally reallocating between human
and physical capital in response to higher youth earning prospects. In
this section we explore the effect of child labor on parental gifts and
bequests.
3.21. Earnings Retained by the Child
Among the most important of parental gifts was the amount of earn-
ings the child was permitted to retain for its ownuse.15 Although it
would be preferable to have data on actual consumption, such data do not
exist and would in any event be difficult to measure since there were
many public goods within the household. The concept of "retained earn-
ings" was frequently used in budget studies during this time period, and
although its definition is clear there is some ambiguity in its inter-
pretation. Retained earnings was that part of earnings a child kept for
its own discretionary use. It is not known, however, the degree to
which it substituted for in—kind transfers. Thus families that allowed
their working children no retained earnings may have compensated them
with goods such as clothing. It is our reading of secular trends in the
data and of the literature that in—kind transfers were poor substitutes
for retained earnings and that retained earnings are a good measure of
wealth transfers to a child while it labored for payJ6
Two unique data sets collected in 1907 as part of extensive Senate
hearings into the conditions of female and child labor permit us to ex-
plore retained earnings and its determinants. One set of data consists
of information on individual unmarried working women living at home with
their parents and gives •data on earnings, retained earnings, and age,—21—
but not, unfortunately, any information on the youth's household. A
second data set consists of information about the families of working
children of both sexes in textiles and the clothing industry. The second
set of data contains a figure for retained earnings by all children in
the family over 15 years old, but no information on retained earnings by
individual child. Thus the first set of data will enable the study of
retained earnings by age for females and the second the determinants of
retained earnings by family and individual characteristicsJ7
Age profiles of weekly earnings and of the percentage of daughters
who retained some earnings from the first data set are reported in Figure
1. Weekly earnings (the dotted lines) rise continuously to age 30, from
approximately $4 (1907$) per week at age 15 to $8—9 per week at age 30.
Average earnings are somewhat higher for daughters who retained positive
earnings. Of greater interest, the percentage of daughters who retained
some earnings never exceeded 50 percent. The percentage approached 50
percent only when the young women were in. their late twenties. At age
21, the percentage was closer to 15 percent. The average percentage of
earnings that were retained by those who retained any earnings at all was
substantial, 51.7 percent, and was relatively invariant with Thspect to
ageJ8 Of weekly earnings of roughly $7, approximately SO cents was re-
tained by the average 21 year old working daughter ($7 x .5 x .15 =$0.53),
that is, 7.5 percent of her earnings, although an average of $3.62 was
retained by those for whom retained earnings was positive.
These data have two deficiencies in terms of providing empirical
content for our model: they deal only with females and they do not have
information on the youth's household, and therefore cannot be used to
measure the impact of father's income, number of siblings, and otherFigure 1: Earnings and Retained Earnings of Unmarried Women Living at
Home and Working in Factories andStores in N.Y.C. in 1907.
(1319 observations)
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continued .-23-
Notes to Figure 1: (RET =retainedearnings)
(1)Weekly Eamings, given RET >0-11.123 +1.403Age -0.0250Age2
(0.455) (0.0097)
=0.186
N =186;standard errors in parentheses.





N =1319;standard errors in parentheses.
(3) % with RET >0
Means at each age are given by x's.—24—
variables. A related data set for 1907 does contain information on the
faintly characteristics of children working in the clothing and cotton
textiles industries as well as information on the value of earnings re-
tained by all children over 15 years in each family. We have estimated
the following relationship over all households having a child older than
15 years:
18) RET = +
61CHY+S2POPY+3KIDS
+ B4SIBS +5POP + e6MOM + 7H0ME + ,R.
where
RET retained earnings of all children >15years
CRY E the earnings of all children >15years old in the family
POP? E the father's income
KIDS E the number of siblin< 15 years old
SIBS E the number of siblings >15years old
POP E the presence of the father
MON E the presence of the mother
HONE1, if the family owned their home, zero otherwise
and
L's E a set of state and city dummies.
The model of Section 2.0 has suggested the importance and the signs
of most of these variables, particularly CII?, the earnings of children,
and POP?, the earnings of the father. The presence of younger siblings
should be equivalent in effect to a decrease in family income; the pres-
ence of older siblings may reduce RET by decreasing the bargaining
strength of other adolescents. The ownership of a home might indicate
more public goods or an environment that would be fairly expensive for a
youth to duplicate in the housing market. and thus it should decrease RET.— 25—
How the presence or absence of the mother affects RET is an interesting
empirical question.
Because RET can take on a zero value, and does with considerable
frequency (in 77.5 percent of the families), estimation of equation (18)
was performed using a TOBIT procedure. The results are given in Table 7.
There are two ways of interpreting the coefficients and related elas-
ticities from this estimation, and this issue is related to that raised
above on the meaning of retained earnings. It is possible that RET might
not have been reported by families that rewarded children with in—kind
transfers rather than with cash. If this were the case, interest should
center on the coefficients and the elasticities of the index (I), that is
on the values conditional on RET >0.However, if zero values are indeed
meaningful, as we believe they are, the elasticity of the expected value
of RET, E(Y), would be of interest.19
Increases in father's income increase RET, and for E(Y) the elas-
ticity of POP? is 0.184. The change in E(Y) is considerably larger for
changes in CHY than it is for changes in POP?, and the amount of earnings
retained by these children rose considerably with increases in their
earnings.20 The coefficient on the child's earnings is 0.62, greater
than the value of 0.52 obtained from the previous sample restricted to
females. Because the data analyzed here are for both males and females,
this indicates that males must have retained a greater percentage of
their income. Younger siblings reduced RET, and so did older ones, but
not with statistical significance. The ownership of a home substantially
reduced RET, as one might expect if children "paid" for the amenity value
of such ownership.21 Finally, the presence of a mother had a profoundly
philanthropic affect on her children.—26—
TABLE 7




Variable Coefficient T_Statistica Elasticity. Elasticity Variable
(8 ) . ofIndex of E(y)c Means
I
(I)b
CHY 0.624 15.32 5.795 1.932 675.6
POPY 0.156 .2.82 0.551 0.184 256.9
KIDS —39.54 —6.20 —1.429 —0.476 2.63
SIBS —17.84 —1.17 —0.579 —0.193 2.36
POP 41.56 1.29 0.422 0.141 0.740
MOM 117.75 2.45 1.517 0.506 0.938
ROME —112.92 —3.48 —0.271 —0.090 0.175
d
State or City Dummies
MASSACHUSETTS —110.32 —3.02 —0.355 —0.118 0.234
NORTH CAROLINA 434.38 12.85 1.555 0.518 0.261
CHICAGO 121.69 3.44 0.429 0.143 0.257
Constant —913.15 —14.55
Number of Observations =2686
Observed frequency of Y >00.225
Predicted frequency of Y> 0, given average XYs =0.186





ditted dummy =NewYork City.—27—
Therefore although children retained a greater percentage of their
earnings as their earnings rose and as their parents' earnings rose, the
fraction who received such transfers and the amounts they received were
small relative to the earnings that were implicitly foregone in the
process.
3.2. Family Assets (Potential Bequests)
That on average such a small fraction of earnings was retained by
these children may have reflected more the timing than the nature of the
asset transfer to the child. It is possible, for example, that the family
simply held the child's earning in trust and intended to bestow the assets
on the child at a later time, perhaps through bequests.
The Wright 1890 Study provides evidence on the likelihood that such
a process occurred. Although the survey did not secure estimates of net
family assets (assets minus liabilities), it did include a question con-
cerning the household's financial status, whether it was "in debt," held
a "surplus," or had "accounts balance."22 A probit analysis of the like-
lihood that the household held a surplus can indicate whether the savings
rate out of child income was indeed higher than that out of other family
income sources.
The probit estimates are reported in Table 8. Family income was
divided into •three components: father's earnings, children's earnings,
and other income.23 All three had powerful positive impacts on the like-
lihood that a family reported positive net family assets. But of more
interest from the current perspective is that the estimated coefficient on
children's earnings is less, not more, than the coefficient on father's
earnings. The hypothesis that children's incomewas simply accumulated by—28—
TABLE8
PROBITESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY OF POSITIVE NET

























Log of Likelihood Function = —1366
Sample Size 2489
aData Source: Wright 1890 study. The de-
pendent variable equals one iffinancialstatus
is "surplus," zero if "in debt" or "accounts
balance."Absolutevalue of asymptotic t—ratio
in parentheses.
bNumber of children in the family between
the ages of zero and ten.—29—
the ,arents for later transmission to the offspring is not supported in
this sample. Future wealth was apparently lower for children who worked.
4.0. Child Labor and the Wages of Adults
The heavy demand for child labor in the textile industry apparently
induced a major reallocation of family resources from the future wealth
of the offspring to the family's current consumption. As discussed in
Section 1.0, these gains to current family income were apparently sub-
stantial. In the wright 1890 Study the average family in textiles re-
ported $173 (1890$) per year in child earnings, the average family in non—
textiles only $51 or $122 less. By comparison the average earnings of
the male household head in the sample was $518. The differential child
earnings corresponded to one quarter of the male head's earnings, clearly
suggesting a major difference in current family economic well—being.
This higher current family income may have been illusory. The U.S.,
even at the turn of this century, was primarily agricultural and the in-
dustrial work force had to be attracted largely from the agriculture
sector. The attractiveness of job offers would involve the family's as-
sessment of various characteristics of the location, including the father's
24
earnings and the possibility of child work.
To the extent families viewed the gain in child labor income as a
simple increase in family income, it i likely they would have migrated
to areas where the demand for child labor was plentiful. Such migration
would have put downward pressure on adult wage rates in industries with
high child labor demands. Such a downward adjustment in adult wages is
consistent, for instance, with the earnings of unskilled labor in the
Wright 1890 Study. In textiles, child earnings per family averaged $199,—30—
in nontextiles, $57. The annual earnings of the father, however, were
$293 in textiles and $447 in nontextile industries, (The endogeneity of the
labor force participation of children will be accounted for in the em-
pirical analysis below..)
IndeS if parents felt no concern for the future well—being of their
offspring, family incomes from all sources would presumably have been
equalized dollar for dollar in the long run. Any gain in family income
due to child labor opportunities would have been completely offset by a
lower wage to the household head. If, however, parental concern for the
child's future welfare were more substantial, the father's earnings would
have dropped less in industries with a high potential for child labor.
The future earnings reductions of the child would partly or totally off-
set the gain in child earnings in the evaluation of the family's compen-
sation bundle.
The process suggested can be formalized using the model developed in
Section 2.0. To attract labor to an industrial location, the firms in the
industry must offer a compensation package equal to or exceeding that of
other firms in the economy. The labor market establishes an equilibrium
compensation level (say V in utility units) and the industry must offer a
rate of adult wages and child labor opportunities that permit the family
to achieve that level. Presumably the equilibrium compensation package
offered workers depends on their skill, age, and other "quality" attributes
25
so equilibrium requires
19) V (Skill, Region, etc)
or
20) (E +E0) (E1)S
=v.The schooling relationshin, eq. (4) ,definesthe tradeoffs possible





from 20) and 21), it is easy to compute the adult
earningsichildearnings gradient:
A'S
1 a =—P + S 0 .5/n
Assuminga fixed child wage rate (w0), variations tn child earniocs will
induce variations in adult wages according to
23) dl =[-1 (_2_/
a v]dEe.
Adultearnines will fall dollar for dollar with child earnings if either
theelasticity of future inccxne with respect to schooling (y) is zero,
that is schooling has no investment value ,cr thencrents pl.ace zero value
on the child's future well—he.ing (5 =0)
The extent of adult earnings reductions, then, reduces to an em—
pirical issue. Lcnation(22)would sugaest escinating an adult earnings
function dependent on child earnings and the arguments in V, namely, skill,
age, regional wage levels. etc. Since the child work constraint may not
bebinding,particularly for high income families, it is not reasonable
tc treat child work (and therefore earnings) as exogenous. In particular,
the earnings of the father may influence child work hours and earnings.
Thined sincle evidence of such an effect was nresented in Section 3.0.—32—
It is necessary, therefore, to. estimate a simultaneous model of
father'searnings CE) and children earnings (E0) of the form
E =ffE0,skill, age, regional wage levels, demographic structure
of children].
E0
=g[E,demographic structure of children (age, sex), regional
wagelevels, industry].
Estimates of a linear approximation to this model are presented in Table
9. The simultaneous structure was estimated using two stage least
squares.
The most interesting coefficient from our viewpoint is the estimate
of the effect of child earnings on father's earnings, —0.714. Controlling
for skill, age, regional wage levels, and nativity, we find a powerfully
significant negative impact of children's earnings on adult wages. Indeed
the annual earnings of the male household head was reduced $0.71 for every
$1.00 increase in children's earnings. Apparently the greater part of the
family's current income gains from child work was offset by the reduced
earnings of the father. From a behavioral perspective, it would appear that
the family did not require a substantial increase in total family earnings
to sacrifice a reasonably large amount of schooling opportunity for their
children.
Briefly reviewing the other estimated coefficients, adult male wages
do increase appreciably with skill level (particularly in the highly craft—
oriented glass industry). Industrial wages are also powerfully correlated
with the labor income of agricultural workers in the state of residence;
Adult earnings reduce children's work effort as well as the reverse (column
2). Children's earnings are also influenced by wage levels in the state,
but much less so than adult wages are. The textile effect is strongest for
female offspring and young (age 11—15) males.—33—
TABLE9




Father's Earnings Children's Earnings


















State Agricultural 0.497 0.0738




Father's Age Squared —0.249
(9.65)
Native Boni —3.989 —16.46
(0.57) (5.51)





Males <15 18.99 29.30 —
(3.04) (8.77)
Males >15 109.0 188.6
(8.77) (51.55)
Females< 15 18.59 4.92 —
(3.01) (1.41)






14> 15 *TEX 13.33
(2.60)




Source: Wright 1890 study.
aThe absolute value of t—ratiosare reported in parentheses. The
sample size is 6610 families, largely in import—competing industries
(textiles, iron and steel, glass, etc.).
bstateaverages of service (or labor) income per agricultural worker.
cNumber of children in the family up to the age of ten,
times a dummy equal to one of father's industry is cotton or woolen
textiles, zero otherwise.-35-
5.0 Conclusion
The structure of industry and the social relationships among family
members have had powerful interactive effects. In the U.S. at the turn of
this century not only did child labor have an almost definitional, negative
effect on schooling, but in addition families provided little in the way
of physical asset transfers (gifts or bequests) to compensate children for
the lost schooling and future earnings. Thus the presence of industries
with a high demand for child labor reduced the future wealth position of
the offspring. The increased family income was apparently absorbed in higher
current family consumption.
But even that economic gain was largely offset by the effect of child
labor possibilities on adult wage rates. Any lack of concern by parents
for lost schooling and future earnings of their children would, in equil-
ibrium, be reflected in lower adult earnings, as families migrated to areas
where child labor was prevalent. If enough parents were totally uncaring,
families would continue to migrate to regions of high child labor until their
own wages were forced down precisely to offset the higher earnings of their
children. The estimates presented show that in the U.S. in 1890 each
$1.00 increase in "child" earnings reduced the earnings of the male head of
the household by $0.71, implying a willingness of some parents to "sell" the
future income of their offspring for current consumption.
We have concentrated on aspects of intrafamily relations among working
class families in the late nineteenth century. Yet, how do our results
illuminate change over time in child labor, schooling, and retained earnings?
Long term trends in all three suggest that parents exhibited substantial con-
cern for the present and future well-being of their offspring. Our results do-36-
yield positive income elasticities for both schooling and retained earnings.
Butour samplecontains only working class families ,and had we one including
familiesnot employed in these industries the impact of income would have
been greater andmoreapplicable to longrun analysis. More importantly, we
believe,manychangesover time cannot be encompassed in cross sectional
analysis. Industries which were previously in the hinterland,became part
ofurban America, as electrification diffused.And as industrial families
lefttheir rural heritages andbecameurbanized, the perceived costs and
benefitsof schooling may have been radically altered. Furthermore, increases
in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio and the rise of the non-domestic service
sector encouraged parents to keep their children in school longer, as did
the legal incentives of school attendance laws. Alternatively the substantial
increasein schooling over time may have been the result of simple good
fortune, that most advanced industrial technologies place little value on
the unskilled labor of children.—37—
Footnotes
cross section (48 states) analysis of youth labor force partici-
pation for 1900 yields:
% 10—15 year olds in labor force ('t'statisticsin parentheses):
Males: 42.95— 0.019 Income + 0.3977. Black +0.091Nfg.




Females: 10.17 + 0.010 Income +0.367% Blacks +0.270Mfg.




Service includes wholesale and retail trades, finance, transportation,
etc. Agriculture is the omitted sector. Source: Census of Population,
1900.
2Economic implications of the lack of identity of interests between
parents and children have been developed in Ishikawa (1975), Parsons
(1975, 1977), and Blinder (1976).
3Families in several other industrial countries were also included
in the sample but were excluded from the current analysis. Michael Haines
kindly provided us with the data set. It should be noted that the families
were not a random sample. See Ilaines (1979) Chapter 5 for a more detailed
discussion of it.
4Schooling investment models of this form are discussed in Becker
(1967), Ishikawa (1975), Parsons (1975), and Blinder (1976).—38—
5lmplicit in this model is the assumption that parents have authority
over minor children and can, in fact, direct their activities and secure
for their own use as much or as little of the child's earnings as they
feel is appropriate. We believe this captures the essence of the child
labor process. Among young adults living in the household of origin, a
more explicit exchange system might be appropriate. See, for example,
Homey and McElroy (1978) and Manser and Brown (1980) for applications of
bargaining models to family processes. We raise some of these issues in
Goldin and Parsons (1980) in relation to the age at which children exit
from the household.
6One might assume that consumption within the household is distributed
in fixed proportions among family members; a higher living standard for
the parents implies a higher living standard for others in the household
as well. We ignore leisure in this model.
7Data from the 1907 Report indicate that transfers from unmarried
young women to their parents drop of f considerably once they leave home
but continue to work.
8The child wealth and wage/schooling relationships are treated (im-
plicitly) by substitution although they obviously could be treated sym-
metrically with the family income constraint. The potential upper bound
on schooling time in the parental household (H >5)is ignored here, an
internal solution is assumed.
91n the Wright 1890 Study the family reported the number of children
in school and the age and sex composition of the family, with the sex of
the children reported only for those eleven years of age or older.—39—
10The population percentages in school by age, sex, and nativity are:
Males Native Born Parents Foreign Females Native Born Parents Foreign
Native PoreignBorn Native ForeignBorn
Age Born Born ParentsAge Born Born Parents
5<9 0.509 0.594 0.60005<9 0.508 0.586 0.589
10<140.839 0.876 0.75510<14 0.849 0.873 0.747
15<19 0.434 0.285 0.12815<19 0.396 0.258 0.096
Source: Census of Population 1896.
The $400 (1890$) figure is the mean of father's earnings in the
textile industry.
2The cohort of women born from 1893 to 1902 reported,when they were
45—54 years old,that they completed 8.8 years of schooling, but the cohort
born between 1908 to 1917 reported ,when they were 45—54 years old,that they
completed 12.0 years. The data for women are 8.6 and 11.3 years schooling
respectively. The source used is Series P—20 Current Population Reports,
1947 and 1962.
'3See, for example, on general wage ratios Keat (1960) and on wage
ratios for occupational groupings of women Goldin (1980).
140n the role of education in enhancing nonmarket productivity, see
Benham (1974) and Leibowitz (1974).
150bviously children also consume goods and services in the household.
This is true of children who do not work, however, as well as those who
do. We know of no evidence that suggests that working children consume
a relatively greater share of family expenditures on goods and services
than do nonworking children (for given total family expenditures and
family size and composition).—40—
16Although some percentage of children who live at home with their
parents continue to work for pay, the income they regularly give over to
their parents seems to have declined considerably since the early twen-
tieth century. Women's Bureau Report No. 183 (1940),which surveyed Cleve-
land, indicated that only 32.8 percent of all daughters under 21 years
living at home and working gave their parents all their earnings. For
those 21 years old to under 30, the percentage was only 18.1. Thus there
was a substantial decrease in the contributions of children to the family
from 1907 to 1940.
17The first sample consists of (1319) young women in manufacturing
and store work in New York City, and the second sample included (2686)
children working in the clothing industry (Chicago and New York) and in
cotton textiles (Massachusetts and North Carolina).
18The regression of % Retained (conditional on RET >0)•on Age and
Age2 has an R2 =0.003.
19The difference between the two slopes is the Probability (Y>0X.'s).
That is, E(Y)/BX. =.Prob(Y>0X.'s),while aI/ax =
20Theelasticity of retained earnings with respect to earnings (for
RET >0)was about 1 in the sample of working females, that is the per-
centage retained was independent of earnings. The difference in the two
samples with respect to this elasticity results from the characteristics
of the children each includes. Observations in the sample of Table 7
are for all children over 15 years old in a family. Thus even though one
child retained earnings, all may not have.—41—
21We are avoiding the issue of bequests here. Childrenmay have ac-
cepted less current wealth in the form of retained earnings to avoid con-
flict where the expected value of a bequest was large.
22Theresponse rate to this question was less than one half that for
questions on family income and other family characteristics. The results
should, therefore, be viewed with correspondingly greater caution.
23The analysis also includes various demographic characteristics of
the family, including age of the father and age and sec of the children.
24For recent work on the economics of family migration see the work
by Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978).
251n this discussion we assume that incomes are sufficiently low that
all transfers to the child are in the form of schooling (T =0).—42—
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